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ORAL AUCTION VERSUS SEALED BIDS:
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
RONALD N. JOHNSON*

INTRODUCTION

Within the past twenty-five years, the role of the federal government as a purveyor of natural resources has expanded significantly.
This trend is particularly apparent in such commodities as timber,
oil, gas, and coal. Concomitant with the federal government's growing responsibility have been charges that the rights to the public's
natural resources have been transferred under "noncompetitive" circumstances and that the use or extraction of these resources have
been undertaken in a "non-optimal" manner. Criticism has focused,
in part, on the choice of disposal procedures available to the various
agencies involved. The allocative consequences that result from such

constraints as the use of a public auction system have not always
been clearly recognized, and proposals for change have been
numerous.1 The recurrent controversy over the use of oral auction
versus sealed bidding procedures at the U.S. Forest Service timber
sales is a particular case in point, and is the subject of this article.
The prevailing impression is that sealed bids will generate higher
prices than oral auctions because collusive practices are facilitated by

the latter method.' This argument has been advanced by Mead who
makes frequent reference to the potential existence of collusive bidding practices at Forest Service timber sales and offers empirical

evidence showing that a sealed bid procedure yields higher prices
than oral auction.' Although Mead states that reasons other than
collusive activity can account for his findings, he offers no clarifi*Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of New Mexico.
1. For an outline of some of the major issues and comparison of alternative proposals,
see Bentley, Forest Service Timber Sales: A Preliminary Evaluation of Policy Alternatives,
94 LAND ECONOMICS 205 (1968). See also Teeguarden, Allocating Public Timber by
Transferable Purchasing Quotas: A Policy Analysis, 9 NAT. RES. J. 576 (1969).
2. Recently the U.S. Congress in writing the National Forest Management Act of 1976,
16 U.S.C. §472a (1976), included a provision (§ 14(e)) on the choice of oral and sealed
bidding. On the premise that sealed bidding obviates collusive practices, Congress has required the use of sealed bidding on all sales. However, due to pressure from some federal
timber buyers, that policy has been subsequently relaxed. A mix of oral and sealed bidding
procedures is currently allowed. See, Proposed Rules, 42 Fed. Reg. 10810 (1977).
3. W. Mead, Natural Resources Disposal Policy-Oral Auction vs. Sealed Bids, 7 NAT.
RES. J. 194 (1967).
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cation as to the specific underlying cause for his empirical results.4
His findings, unfortunately, have been interpreted by some as
implying the existence of collusive and noncompetitive activity.'
In this paper it will be shown both theoretically and empirically
that sealed bidding can, as Mead argues, generate higher prices than
oral auction. The important point, however, is that the results do not
imply the presence of collusive activity. Furthermore, the observation that sealed bidding yields higher prices than oral auction should
not be construed as a mandate for the exclusive use of sealed bidding
on all sales. There may exist efficiency gains from the use of oral
rather than sealed bidding as the latter procedure can lead to the
misallocation of resources by not allowing counteroffers to be made
by the participants. Since a sealed bidding procedure allows the bidder only one bid and that bid is presumed to be submitted in
ignorance of the value of opponents' bids, misallocation can result as
the highest value user may not submit the winning bid.6 If misallocation results, the frequency of resale arrangements should be higher
for sealed bidding than for an oral auction procedure. Resale is of
course costly, and these costs should be considered when discussing
policy. In Section V evidence will be presented that confirms the
hypothesis of a higher frequency of resale for sealed bid auctions as
compared to oral.
The major objective of this paper is to show that there are certain
circumstances whereby oral and sealed bidding can be expected to
yield the same price and other circumstances where sealed bidding is
expected to yield a higher price. The task of delineating the two
situations will be accomplished by distinguishing between homogeneous and nonhomogeneous bidding cases. The term "homogeneity" as used here will carry a slightly different connotation than
usual. Essentially, it will be used to denote a situation where none of
the bidders holds a known a priori advantage over any other bidder. 7
Given homogeneity, it will be argued that the expected winning bid
4. Mead, supra note 3, at 213-215.
5. Statements to the effect that Mead's findings show that oral auction facilitates collusive activity were frequently made during recent congressional hearings on the impact of
NFMA, supra note 2, §472a(e). See Timber Sales Methods and Related Practices, Hearing
on H.R. 5863 Before the House Committee on Agriculture, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (1977).
Also see K. Olson, Social Returns from LiquidatingExcess Inventories of Public Timber, 53
LAND ECONOMICS 349 (1977).
6. This point has been raised previously. See Vickrey, Counter-speculation,Auctions, and
Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J. FINANCE 8 (1961). See also Miller, Oral and Sealed
Bidding, Efficiency versus Equity 12 NAT. RES. J. 330 (1972).
7. The separation of bidding situations into homogeneous and nonhomogeneous cases
will be shown to depend upon the degree to which firms are similar or different in regards to
ownership of certain capital assets.
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is the same for both oral and sealed bidding, while nonhomogenity
can result in a higher price under the sealed bid procedure. The
hypotheses developed are tested utilizing actual bidding data from
Forest Service timber sales.
DEFINING THE HOMOGENEOUS AND NONHOMOGENEOUS
BIDDING CASES
In order to understand what is meant by a homogeneous bidding
case, imagine a situation in which there is a known vector of market
prices for wood products. Each bidder evaluates the quality of the
timber on the sale site and based on his knowledge of timber determines a final end product value Pi. Further, assume that each potential bidder has a cost structure (C.) for harvesting timber and manufacturing lumber that is the same ?or all bidders-a fact known by all.
None of the bidders, however, are assumed to know the true costs
involved. Each bidder arrives at an estimate of the true cost (C1 )
based on his knowledge of logging and manufacturing costs and the
information obtained from on-site inspection. Given uncertainty and
errors in estimation, both Pi and Ci can vary from bidder to bidder.
The maximum value (Vi) that any bidder (i) is willing to pay for the
timber is Vi = Pi - Ci.
The conditions of homogeneity can also be stated in a manner
analogous to a parlor game where there are n bidders, each drawing a
value at random from the same well-defined distribution. In this
game each bidder is assumed to know his own value or draw but does
not know the values drawn by any of the other bidders. Each does,
however, know the moments of the distribution from which the
values are drawn. The described conditions constitute what will be
referred to as a homogeneous bidding situation because each bidder
has an equal chance of drawing the highest V and winning the
auction.
Homogeneity as defined here is an important concept because it
implies that no bidder possesses a known a priori advantage over any
other bidder. Such a condition is fundamental to a result derived by
William Vickrey who has shown, via a game theoretic approach, the
equality of the expected winning bid under both oral and sealed bid
auction procedures.8 [See Appendix A]. Vickrey's result will be
subjected to an empirical test of the equality of the winning bid
under oral and sealed bidding where the conditions for homogeneity
are believed to exist.
In some bidding situations, the assumption that the bidders are
8. Vickrey, supra note 6.
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homogeneous is inappropriate. For instance, there will be occasions
when a bidder or group of bidders will be known to have a lower cost
structure for a particular type of timber sale. The existence of such a
priori knowledge is inconsistent with conditions outlined for the
homogeneous bidder case. The impact that knowledge of another
bidder's strength can have on the difference between prices received
under oral and sealed bidding can be significant. When some bidders
possess a known comparative cost advantage, the use of oral bidding
poses a distinct disadvantage to the seller. For example, in a simple
two bidder case a situation such as the one portrayed in Figure 1
could arise. Again utilizing a game theoretic approach, the figure
shows a two-bidder case where bidder X is presumed to draw his
value over the interval [O,a] while bidder Y draws from the higher
valued interval [a,b]. If both bidders know the interval each draws
from, and there are some costs for participating in the auction, bidder X will not participate in an oral auction sale. In this example, Y
would be the only bidder and take the auction at a zero price or with
appropriate rescaling of the intervals, at the seller's refusal price. It
would be argued, though, that X would show up anyway just to see
that Y does not get away cheaply. But this argument implies that Y's
wealth somehow enters X's utility function. Given a cost for participating in the auction, it is understandable that X would be
reluctant to participate and appear apathetic. 9

f (V) xf(v)

0,
a

b

Value (v)

FIGURE 1
The Nonhomogeneous Bidding Case
9. Miller, supra note 6, presents a similar argument and labels the reluctance of bidders to
participate in the nonhomogeneous case as "bidder apathy."
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However, X's chances for success improve when sealed bidding is
used. Assuming that no recontracting between X and Y is allowed, X
can win by playing a pure strategy designed to keep his bids between
0 and his value drawing. Since bidder X bids less than (a), bidder Y
will find it to his advantage to always bid less than (a). The probability of winning would equal unity if Y bid above (a). Thus, in
order to maximize expected returns he will bid less than (a). Consequently, this circumstance will provide X with the opportunity to
win on some of the sales. Once recontracting is allowed, the strategy
of the game will alter as each player must now recognize the opportunity for resale. The possibility of gain from resale is an added
incentive to participation in the sale.
The number of bidders in the nonhomogeneous case need not, of
course, be restricted to two. But the chances of the above event
occurring is likely to decrease as the number of potential bidders
increases.' 0 The analysis of the nonhomogeneous case leads to the
following hypothesis. Where the conditions for nonhomogeneity do
exist, both the number of bidders participating and the winning bid
will be lower for oral auction sales than sealed bid sales. In comparison, the conditions for homogeneity imply the equality of both
the winning bids and the number of bidders for the oral and sealed
bidding procedures. In the next section criteria for actually identifying homogeneous and nonhomogeneous bidding situations at
Forest Service timber sales is presented.
CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING THE NONHOMOGENEOUS
BIDDING CASE

The communities of Forest Service timber purchasers'are, in
almost all areas, generally small and the members well known to each
other. There are numerous opportunities in everyday activities to
observe and take note of competitors' circumstances. It is not difficult, for instance, for timber companies to have knowledge of rivals'
plant capacities and have a fairly good idea as to their log inventories.
Also, there are firms that possess specialized road building equipment
and those that do not. Many believe that the larger firms in the
industry possess significant cost advantages over their smaller sized
counterparts on sales that require large road construction outlays or
contain a high volume of timber. For example, a study on public
land use by George Banzhaf and Co. contains the following statement:
10. The average number of bidders participating on all sales for the sample data utilized
in this study was less than three.
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The most important existing constraints on sale size are those imposed by the necessity of road development funding through timber
purchases. The high per mile costs ... mean that a sufficient volume
of timber must be included in a sale to enable the purchaser to
recover his road building costs through stumpage payment credits.
This is a particular problem in areas with high road costs and low
values per unit of timber volume. As a result, the smaller purchasers
are often incapable of handling such sales because of the working
capital requirements and specialized equipment needed. 1
Many Forest Service timber sales require that the purchaser con-

struct roads into the sale area. Some of the smaller firms that purchase Forest Service timber have argued that firms possessing
specialized road building equipment are at a distinct advantage in
bidding on those sales. Their argument apparently focuses on the
ability of the larger firms to maintain and utilize inventories of the
required specialized road building equipment. Recently the United
States Congress has reacted to this complaint. In Public Law 94-588
a provision was included that allows the purchaser, should he qualify
as a "small business," the privilege of deciding whether he or the
Forest Service shall construct permanent roads required by the terms
of the sale. Public Law 94-588, Sec. 14(i)(1) states the following:
For the sales of timber which include a provision for purchaser
credit for construction of permanent roads with an estimated costs
in excess of $20,000, the Secretary of Agriculture shall promulgate
regulations requiring that the notice of sale afford timber purchasers
qualifying as "small business concerns" under the Small Business
Act, as amended and the regulations issued thereunder, an estimate
of the cost and the right, when submitting
a bid, to elect that the
12
Secretary build the proposed road.

Prior to the enactment of Public Law 94-588 in October of 1976, all
purchasers of timber sales requiring major road construction were
treated similarly. Contracts that called for permanent road construction allowed for a system of credits based on the estimated costs of
road construction. The credits are applied towards payment for the
timber on the sale site.
A number of purchasers of Forest Service timber apparently
believe that major road construction requirements are a deterrent to
their firms' participation on a sale, and Congress seems to agree with
11. GEORGE BANZHAF AND CO., STUDY OF PUBLIC LAND TIMBER POLICY 36
(Prepared for Public Land Review Commission, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, October 1969). See
also F. HO, SMALL LUMBER COMPANIES IN WESTERN OREGON (University of Portland, for Small Business Administration, Washington, D.C. April 1963).
12. P.L. 94-588, § 14(i)(1).
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them. The notion that some firms possess a comparative advantage
on those sales will provide the basis for distinguishing between the
homogeneous and nonhomogeneous cases. Thus, the frequency of
nonhomogeneity is expected to be sufficiently high when road construction costs are above $20,000 to provide a test of the hypothesis
developed in the previous section. Empirical evidence on the appropriateness of this criteria is presented in the next section.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In order to test the hypothesis presented in the previous sections,
it was first necessary to select an area of the country where both oral
and sealed bid procedures were used with roughly comparable frequency and where there was a wide variance across sales in the
amount of road construction required. Region I of the U.S. Forest
Service, which encompasses the northern part of Idaho and Montana,
constitutes such an area. In terms of total sales, 60 percent of the
sales in this region for the time period July 1, 1973, to July 1, 1975,
were by sealed bid and the remainder by oral. Of the 379 sales
analyzed, 186 had road requirements exceeding $20,000, and the
remaining 193 were below this value.
Of course, standing timber is hardly a homogeneous commodity.
As a result, the average bid price per thousand board feet can vary
substantially from sale to sale due to variations in logging costs,
quality of timber, and other factors. To control for such variance in
the statistical analysis, the components of the Forest Service timber
appraisal will be utilized.
By law, the Forest Service is required to sell timber for not less
than the appraised value. 1 3 Compliance with this regulation is essentially achieved by estimating a "market value" for the stumpage
on a particular site. 1 4 The appraisal process evolves by working backward from the selling prices of the final timber products, with the
initial stage in the determination of the appraisal being a timber
cruise or inventory of the sale site. Volume and quality estimates by
species are obtained from the cruise and are then used to estimate
the final selling values based on current lumber and other wood
products. Estimated operating costs for an operator of "average efficiency" are subtracted from the final product value. Included are
costs for road construction, harvesting and removal of timber, milling
13. Organic Administration Act of June 1897 (30 Stat. 34 (1897)), as amended (16
U.S.C. §476 (1976)).
14. For a complete description of the appraisal procedure,see U.S. FOREST SERVICE,
HANDBOOK § 2420 (undated).
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and other manufacturing costs. The residual from this arithmetic
exercise is the stumpage value or appraised price. Upon completion
of the appraisal, a sales report is issued and a thirty-day waiting
period for public advertisement ensues. On the designated day of the
sale, the timber is awarded to the highest bidder by use of either a
sealed or oral auction procedure. The winning bid must be greater
than or equal to the advertised minimum rates, and the bids must be
accompanied by deposits and performance bonds.
The appraisal elements are used here as controlling variables in the
estimating equations. The diversity of the attributes of timber sales
necessitates the use of variables to control for this variance, and in
the absence of other measures of the various costs and values, Forest
Service appraised values have been used. In utilizing the appraised
values, the Forest Service estimates stumpage values in a systematic
manner. The appraisers were obligated to follow the Forest Service
manual, which describes in detail the appraisal procedures to be used.
The procedures are highly standardized, and there are checks and
controls aimed at detecting deviations from these standards. The use
of a highly systematic procedure does not, of course, imply highly
accurate appraisals, but merely that the deviations from the true
values are consistent across the sample. Consequently, the elements
or components of the appraisals can serve as controlling variables,
and the resulting coefficients obtained in the regression runs indicate
about where the errors in the appraisals lie. For example, if the cost
components of the appraisal such as logging costs are accurately
measured, the coefficient for that variable should equal a negative
one. The regression coefficients indicate how the buyers evaluate the
components of the appraisal.
The estimating procedure adopted follows the "hedonic pricing"
approach, which is well-illustrated by the works of Lancaster,' I
Ridker and Henning.' 6 Auction bidding is discussed by Kessel. 1 7 In
place of physical characteristics, which were unavailable, I utilize the
dollar values of the appraisal components so that the testing equation
for determining the effects of an oral or sealed bid procedure on the
value of the winning bid becomes:
i
Yt =
+ i=1
2; biXi t + et
i = 1,2,3,...j
15. K. LANCASTER, CONSUMER DEMAND: A NEW APPROACH (1971).
16. Ridker & Henning, The Determinants of Residential Property Values With Special
References to Air Pollution, 44 REV. ECON. STAT. 246 (1967).
17. Kessel, A Study of the Effects of Competition in the Tax-Exempt Bond Market, 79
J. POLIT. ECON. 706 (1971).
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The dependent variable is the average price paid per thousand board
feet and the Xi's are characteristics of the sale. All components of
the Forest Service appraisal are included as explanatory variables,
descriptions of which are contained in Appendix B. In addition, a
dummy variable (MSO) that takes the value one when the sale is oral
auction and zero when by sealed bid is included. The log of the
number of bidders enters as an explanatory variable as a consequence
of the theoretical results developed in Appendix A.
The specification of the testing equation utilized here differs from
the approach taken by Mead who employed the bid-appraisal ratio as
the dependent variable.' 8 The use of the bid-appraisal ratio as the
dependent variable is inappropriate for at least two reasons. First, if
here is little variance in the average bid price across different sales
but a considerable amount of variance in the average appraised price,
the estimates obtained may be significantly biased when the average
appraised price is included as an independent or explanatory variable.
When using OLS, a basic assumption is that of the independence of
the error terms and the explanatory variables such that the covariance between the error term (et) and the average appraised price is
zero. It can be shown in a simple model where the bid price is held
constant, that et and the average price are correlated. 1 Second, in
analyzing the data for Region I for the time period July 1, 1973 to
July 1, 1975, it was observed that the mean of the winning bid prices
in constant 1967 dollars was $36.01 per thousand board feet. The
standard deviation was 22.08. Comparing the above values to a mean
of 2.39 for the bid-appraisal ratio with a standard deviation of 4.12
does not lend support to the use of bid-appraisal ratios. The reason is
the bid appraisal ratios have a higher variance relative to that of the
average bid price. Furthermore, when utilizing bid-appraisal ratios,
one is in essence asserting that all components of the appraisal are
measured with the same degree of accuracy. When this assertion does
18. Mead, supra note 3. Also, MEAD, COMPETITION AND OLIGOPSONY IN THE
DOUGLAS FIR LUMBER INDUSTRY (1966).
19. To understand how bias can be introduced by this type of specification, assume the
average bid price is a constant and it is the average appraisal value that varies. Then, the
bid-appraisal ratio must be negatively related to the average appraisal price. If one were to
run the regression.
Y = + bkXk + e t ,
the error terms e t will be correlated with Xk. Since Y must be greater than or equal to one,
b must be negative and a positive. I have, in essence, introduced bias by inappropriately
specifying the relationship between Y and Xk. Of course, when there is variance in the
average bid price, the correlation between e t and Xk can be assumed reduced, but it would
be precarious to say that the correlation can be assumed to be zero.
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not hold, the accuracy of the total appraised value is dependent upon
the relative accuracy obtained in estimating each component and the
magnitude or size of each component, which can vary from sale to
sale. Inclusion of the individual components of the appraisal on the
right hand side of the estimating equation with the average winning
bid price on the left removes that difficulty.
Adhering to the "hedonic pricing" approach, all major components of the appraisal are included on the right-hand side of the
estimating equation. The cost components are to be expressed as an
average where total cost for each component has been divided by
total estimated volume on the stand. The reason for using averages is
the result of the very large variance in volume across different sales.
The mean volume on all sales in Region I was 4494 thousand board
feet, and the standard deviation was 5398 thousand board feet. If
one were, for instance, to use the total bid value as the dependent
variable, about 90 percent of the variation in total bids could be
explained by total volume on the sale, thus dominating the estimating process. An appropriate measure for negating the effects of a
dominant variable is to use average values. Also, by using average
values, the potential problem of heteroscedasticity 2 0 is significantly
reduced, and both plots and tests of the residuals showed them to be
uniformly distributed across the sample when arranged in ascending
order of the variable for total volume (VOL).
The amount $20,000 will be used in this analysis to identify and
21
separate the homogeneous and nonhomogeneous bidding cases.
The basic premise is that the frequency of nonhomogeneity will
increase with the size of the road construction requirement. Note,
though, that Public Law 94-588 was not in effect prior to October,
1976, and consequently, is not a consideration for the empirical
analysis other than as a basis for distinguishing the homogeneous and
nonhomogeneous cases.
The wisdom of Congress can, of course, be challenged. In support
of the use of the amount $20,000 to separate the two bidding scenarios, the following empirical results are offered. In Region I, 38
percent of the total number of bidders participating on sales with
under $20,000 in required road construction were large firms (those
having 500 or more employees). For sales requiring $20,000 or more
in required road construction, the same percentage estimate was 78
20. The term "heteroelasticity" refers to a situation wherein the ordinary least squares
method does not produce the best linear unbiased estimates because the variance of the
error term differs among various observations.
21. The amount of $20,000 is the figure set by Congress as stated in 16 U.S.C. §472a(i)
(1) (1976).
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percent. This result is consistent with the argument that the larger
firms have a comparative advantage in projects requiring road building.
A second result that supports the use of the $20,000 figure pertains to the stability of the regression coefficients across the entire
sample when no distinction is made between sales requiring a high
expenditure on roads and those with a lower value. Regressions identical to those shown in Tables IB and lIB were run for the entire
sample of 379 cases. The sample was then separated into two sections-high and low road costs, and estimates obtained for the two
separate categories. An F-test was then applied to the residuals. The
computed F-statistic is 2.20 for the regression estimates with the
average bid price as the dependent variable. 2 2
The subcategories were then examined to determine whether the
coefficients are stable within each of the two groups. The results
indicate that they are, and further disaggregation was not called for.
An identical test was also performed using the number of bidders as
the dependent variable, and the F-statistic for that test was 3.24.
Although the F-tests indicate a difference in the underlying structure, high and low road construction cost is not the only candidate
for making the distinction between the two bidding cases (homogeneous and nonhomogeneous). It may be that sales with a high volume
of timber offer larger firms an edge in the bidding process. Larger
firms generally have sawmills with larger capacities and purchase
more timber than most of the smaller operators. There may be economies of scale evident here, for if risk-averse behavior is introduced,
the larger firms that purchase more timber both in terms of volume
and number of individual sales could benefit from risk pooling. Variance in the quality and volume of timber from sale to sale is readily
evident. The ability to pool risks could imply that large firms have an
advantage on high volume sales. It is difficult, however, to separate
out the effects of volume and road construction costs. The simple
correlation between these variables (VOL and TOTROAD) for Region I is .81.
22.
+
RSS 3 )1 *(N- 2K)= 2.20
RSSS,,- - (RSS 8 6
I
K
L (RS 1 8 6 + RSS,,,)
where RSS 3 79 is the regression sum of squared residuals when the estimation is across the
entire sample. RSS, 86 and RSS, 9, are, respectively, the sum of squared residuals for sales
having high and low road costs. The total number of observations (N) is equal to 379 and K
is the number of independent variables including the constant term in the model. The
critical value for F(K, N - 2K) is approximately 1.60 at a level of significance of .05. Since
the computed F-statistic exceeds the critical value, the hypothesis of uniform equality of
the coefficients across the entire sample is rejected.

F-

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 19

In order to test the hypothesis that the choice of auction procedure can affect the number of bidders participating, an estimating
equation that includes the major components of the appraisal will be
utilized. The reason for including the appraisal components as explanatory variables for the number of bidders is that a "high" appraisal could reduce the number of bidders simply because the probability of the refusal price exceeding the maximum willingness to pay
for any given bidder would be greater. In support of this hypothesis,
note that the simple correlation between the number of bidders participating and the appraised price is a negative .15. Although this
result is consistent with the above hypothesis, timber is not homogeneous, and a more careful analysis is called for.
Additional support for the above reasoning is provided by the
following. The simple correlation between the bid-appraisal ratio and
the average appraised price for Region I is a negative .32. Furthermore, the simple correlation between the winning average bid price
less the average appraised price and the number of bidders participating is .62. Based on these results, a "low" appraisal is taken to
imply a high bid-appraisal ratio and consequently a greater spread
between the bid and appraised price. With a "low" appraisal, more
bidders are likely to participate as is corroberated by the correlation
of the difference between the bid less the appraised price and the
number of bidders. By including each major component of the appraisal in the regression equation, it is possible
to account for their
2
effect on the number of bidders participating. 3
The empirical results for the homogeneous cases are shown in
Table I. Table II contains the results for the nonhomogeneous cases.
As predicted, the coefficients on MSO are not significantly different
than zero in the homogeneous case. This result indicates that the
choice of oral or sealed bidding influences neither the number of
bidders participating nor the value of the winning bid. On the other
hand, the results in Table II reveal significantly negative coefficients
on MSO in the nonhomogeneous cases.2
The hypotheses stated
earlier are confirmed. Where the frequency of nonhomogeneity is
likely to be high, an oral auction procedure will yield lower prices
23. It is apparent from the low R2 obtained for the regressions shown in Tables IA and
llA that the number of bidders participating on a sale is not solely determined by "high" or
"low" appraisals. Other factors such as saw log inventories and alternative sources of supply
undoubtedly can have an effect on the number of bidders participating.
24. The results shown in Tables 1B and 1iB are to be interpreted as holding the number
of bidders constant. Additional testing shows that excluding the variable log NBID from the
regression equation in Table 1B had no effect on the coefficient for the variable MSO. On
the other hand, when excluding log NBID in the nonhomogeneous case, the coefficient on
MSO was even more significantly negative.
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TABLE I
The Homogeneous Case
Estimates of Regression Equations Explaining
(A)
Number of Bidders
Explanatory
Variable
MSO
SBA
Log NBID
FLAT
CONST
SL
GO
HAUL
MFGC
FB
ENVC
PERPULP
PERDEAD
AVGROAD
TOTROAD
SELLV
SALV
VOL
VOLSQ
LUMB
CONSTANT TERM
NOTES:

1)
2)
3)
4)

Coefficient

-. 136
.028
-. 030
.013
-. 014
.037*
-. 081*
-. 016
-. 002
.019
.042
-587E-04
-. 011*
.100
.648E-03*
-. 537E-07*
.001
2.673*

2
R =.219 (A)
2
R = .133 (A)
2 =
.853 (B)
R
R2 = .836 (B)

Coefficien t

Standard
Error
.235
.325

-. 090
-. 151

(B)
Winning Bid

,238
.029
.024
.108
.040
.016
.047
.017
.006
.014
.051
.635 E-04
.005
.194
.168E-03
.155E-07
.008
1.240

Standard
Error

-1.797
-2.402
15.193*
.666
- .881*
-1.017"

1.733
2.400
2,996
1,756
.215
.177

-.
-

.801
.296
.121
.351
.130
.051
.107
.381
.468E-03
.040
1.431
.001
.117E-06
.064
9.169

.431
751*
.596*
.768*
.951*
.275*
.384*
.106
.423E-05
.580*
-1.725
.901E-03
.336E-07
.068
12.415

5) Number of observations equals 193.
6) * denotes significant at .05 level.

than sealed bidding. Before proceeding, it will be useful to consider

an additional result pertaining to the effect of restricting the participation of large firms on some sales.
The Forest Service conducts auctions where only those firms who
qualify as a "small business" may participate on a sale. 2 s A small
business is defined as one having less than five hundred employees
and engaged in the manufacture of lumber. In order to capture the
effect of this entry restriction, the dummy variable SBA was included in all regression runs. The value of the variable SBA is one
when the participation is restricted to small business only, and it is
zero otherwise.

The results shown in Table I (A and B) for the homogeneous case
25. For a detailed explanation of small business "set-aside" sale program see U.S. FOREST SERVICE, HANDBOOK § 2431.12 (undated).
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TABLE 1I
The Nonhomogeneous Case
Estimates of Regression Equations Explaining
(A)
Number of Bidders
Explanatory
Variable

Coefficient

MSO
SBA
Log NBID
FLAT
CONST
SL
GO
HAUL
MFGC
FB
ENVC
PERPULP
PERDEAD
AVGROAD
TOTROAD
SELLV
SALV
VOL
VOLSQ
LUMB
CONSTANT TERM
NOTES: 1)
2)
3)
4)

RI
R2
R2
R2

=.376
= .305
=.832
=.881

- .562*
- .561*

-1.687
-

.119
.093*
.652
.012
.145*

.045
- .137*

.002
.163
- .018
- .324E-05
- .012*

.207
.411E-04

.230E-09
.009

1.354
(A)
(A)

Standard
Error
.246
.282
1.133
.089
.030
.406
.048
.026
.061
.041
.015
.101
.024
.249E-05
.008
.417
.580E-04
.221E-08
.012
2.004

(B)
Winning Bid
Coefficient
- 4.394*
- 4.031*
21.479*
.053
.807
- .932*
4.341
- .204
.003
- .804*
- .444
.007
- 1.210*
.366*
- .349E-04*
.563*
- 2.354
.274E-03
.123E-07
.129
-45.301*

Standard
Error
1.604
1.846
3.346
7.398
.580
.203
2.680
.313
.188
.398
.276
.101
.656
.157
.161E-04
.053
2.699
.375E-03
.143E-07
.080
12.976

5) Number of observations equals 186.
6) * denotes significant at .05 level.

(B)
(B)

indicates that restricting the sale to small business firms only does
not significantly affect either the number of bidders participating or
the value of the winning bid. Apparently, a sufficient number of
smaller firms are in the market for Forest Service timber or are able
to enter the market so that the entry restriction imposed on large
firms does not significantly reduce the number of bidders participating in those sales. When the bidders are homogeneous and there are
potential entrants, a restriction on one class of purchasers will have
little effect on the total number of bidders participating. Simply
stated, there will be a sufficient number of small firms that will enter
the bidding slots vacated by large firms as a result of the restriction
of their participation. However, in the nonhomogeneous case (Table
IIA and IIB) the coefficient on SBA is significantly negative.
This last result is consistent with the notion that some firms have a
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comparative cost advantage in road building. A comparative advantage in road building did not, of course, materialize in the nonhomogeneous bidder case like manna from heaven. The advantage is
the result of investment in the specialized equipment required for
road construction. In order to capture adequate returns for the investment in specialized equipment, a firm must win a large number
of sales. The chances of a potential entrant winning a sufficient
number of sales in both open competition and, if otherwise qualified
on small business sales, may not justify the investment in specialized
equipment. By restricting the entry of firms that do have specialized
equipment, mainly the large firms, it is not surprising that the variable SBA has a negative effect on the number of bidders.
There are two counter arguments to the above discussion: (1)
resale of the contract by a small firm to a large firm having major
road building capacity, and (2) subcontracting the road building
work to a firm that has the required equipment. The first point can
be easily disposed of. By regulation, such restricted sales may not be
resold to a firm classified as large. 2 6 The second point is not so easily
rebutted. If there were no differences in costs of subleasing and
owning road building equipment, homogeneity of the bidders would
be established. Personal conversations with industry personnel have
indicated, however, that subcontracting for road construction poses a
distinct cost disadvantage on a bidder. Apparently, owning and renting cannot be treated as the same. The results shown in Table II for
the variable SBA confirms the hypothesis that subcontracting is not a
perfect substitute for ownership and that restricting participation on
sales requiring large outlays for road2 construction reduces the returns
received by the federal government. 7
THE FREQUENCY OF RESALE ARRANGEMENTS
As stated earlier, sealed bidding, as compared to oral auction, is
more likely to result in an outcome where the highest value user may
not submit the winning bid. Such a non-Pareto outcome could be the
result of either simple errors in judgment or, as may be inferred from
the nonhomogeneous bidder case, represent a deliberate attempt at
bidding for resale. The point that sealed bidding can result in nonPareto outcomes has caused some concern. Both Vickrey 2 I and
26. Seeld., §2431.
27. Separate regression runs were
Service timber at lower prices than
larger firms did not obtain timber at
Mead (1966) supra note 18 at 217.
Bidding for Federally Owned Timber
28. Vickrey, supra note 6 at 28.

also made to test whether large firms purchased Forest
the smaller-sized firms. The results indicated that the
lower prices. This result is contrary to the findings of
For empirical results see R. N. Johnson, Competitive
142 (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Washington 1977).
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Miller 2 9 are more approving of oral auctions on the grounds of efficiency. However, they ignore the possibility of resale.
Although an outcome may be non-Pareto in the first instance, the
ability of the winning bidder to transfer title to the firm or individual
having the highest value will go a long way to restoring the efficiency
requirements normally sought in market transactions. There are
transaction costs, of course, and even though resale is facilitated in
this case by terms of the timber sale contract which allows resale,
these costs may not be negligible. It follows that if resale is allowed,
it should occur more often under a sealed bid procedure than for oral
auction.
For Region I, information on all sales originally sold between July
1, 1973, to June 30, 1975, that were subsequently "third-partied" or
resold was obtained from each National Forest in the Region. In
addition, information as to the names of the firms or individuals to
whom the sale was third-partied and whether the resale arrangement
was part of a merger agreement between the two transacting parties
was obtained. If the resale arrangement was part of a firm merger, it
was excluded from the analysis. Dealing with just nonmerger thirdparty sales reduced the total number of resales to seven.
Recall that 60 percent of all sales in Region I were sold in a sealed
bid procedure; the remainder were sold by oral auction. As it turns
out, all seven third-party arrangements were sold originally by a
sealed bid procedure. The hypothesis is confirmed.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Judging from the theoretical arguments presented here and supported by the empirical findings, sealed bidding can generate higher
observed prices than oral auction. The findings of higher prices for
sealed bidding in the nonhomogeneous case were not based on any
inferred presence of collusive or noncompetitive activity. The proponents of sealed bidding have predicated their argument on the
alleged presence of collusive activity. A finding that sealed bidding
generates higher bid prices than oral auction does not, by itself,
imply the existence of noncompetitive activity.
In only one case, involving collusive activity and Forest Service
timber sales, has the Justice Department been able to obtain a conviction. 3 0 Furthermore, the data on bid appraisal ratios for the region studied do not suggest widespread collusive activity. For Region
I the mean bid-appraisal ratio was above two. Even if this ratio has its
29. Miller, supra note 6.
30. U.S. v. Champion International Corp., Cr 74-698 (D. Ore. 1974).

April 1979]

ORAL AUCTION VERSUS SEALED BIDS

faults as a measurement of competition, one would think that with
widespread collusive activity the mean bid-appraisal ratio would be
close to unity. More significantly, the proponents for sealed bidding
have not shown that entry into the market for federal timber is
restricted. The existence of collusive activity, at least in the long run,
requires that entry be restricted. The high cost of specialized road
building equipment is not a restriction on entry. No firm is explicitly
barred from purchasing such equipment. In fact, the federal government is responsible for the only entry restrictions detected. It was
shown in the empirical analysis that set-aside sales generate significantly lower returns to the federal government when road construction requirements are relatively high. One point seems quite clear
from the analysis presented; the Forest Service should abstain from
offering set-aside sales that require large outlays for road construction.
The imposition of the exclusive use of sealed bidding as originally
mandated by Public Law 94-588 may be justifiable where the frequency of nonhomogeneous bidding situations is significant. However, any nominal gain in receipts to the federal treasury should not
be taken at face value. Sealed bidding, as was demonstrated, can lead
to non-Pareto outcomes and higher frequency of resale than oral
auction. The non-Pareto outcomes and the act of resale constitute a
cost, one that is born by society taken in the aggregate. In areas
where the number of bidders is large, the frequency of nonhomogeneous bidding situations described here is likely to be very small,
and the returns to the exclusive use of sealed bidding rather than oral
auction could be negative.
It has been stated elsewhere that the federal lands "have become
big business." 3" Yet, agencies such as the Forest Service do not
operate like a big business. Unlike privately owned firms, they are
constrained in their choice of sales procedures. The imposition of
such constraints is not without reason as the public appears to be
acutely aware of the bias inherent in decisions made in an environment marked by the absence of private property rights. The almost
exclusive use of the auction technique distinguishes the Forest Service disposal procedures from that of large, privately owned timbergrowing firms that employ both auction and negotiated sale procedures. 3 2 There are, no doubt, situations where there are few
bidders and the use of an auction technique may be an ill-advised
method for maximizing returns. The maximization of returns to fed31. See Clawson, The Federal Lands as Big Business, 7 NAT. RES. J. 183 (1967).
32. For a discussion of private sales procedures see Johnson, supra note 27, at 26-31.
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erally owned timber is a prime objective because timber is not a fixed
stock. Rather, it is a resource that can be augmented by investment
in response to changes in the prices received for it. Correct investment decisions require that prices reflect adequately the marginal
willingness to pay. Auction sales may not consistently provide that
information.
The emphasis in much of the literature on natural resource economics has been directed at market failures. Analysis of these failures
suggest that the workings of private market exchanges are biased
against social welfare maximization. But government ownership or
regulation of natural resources exhibits its own set of costs. Part of
the cost of governmental ownership of a resource such as timber is
reflected in the choice of disposal procedures used and characterized
by preferential treatment such as the Small Business Set-aside Sales
Program. Some economists appear to believe that the timber resources of public lands are being preyed upon, and there may be
circumstances where this is true. Yet, should the National Forests, by
historical accident, be privately owned by a single firm, I suspect that
firm would be treated more like a predator than as the prey. Each
alternative has its own set of costs, the recognition of which is a first
step in specifying natural resource policy.
APPENDIX A
The Equality of the Expected Winning Bid for Oral and Sealed
Bidding Procedures in the Homogeneous Case
In the oral bidding procedure, the bidding will progress up to the value drawn
by the second highest bidder. Of course, in actual practice, the winning bid will

be some small amount above the second highest value drawn. However, for
expositional purposes, bidding will be assumed to stop at the second highest

value drawn.
Given n drawings from the same set of values (V), the probability that n - j
draws results in values V > V*, that j - 1 draws results in values v < v*, with the
jth draw giving a value v = v* is given by:
1) [F(V)I j' l [I - F(V)] n j f(V)
where: F(V) and f(V) denote, respectively, the cumulative distribution function and the density function.
Since the values of V can be ordered within the sets, the following number of
permutations is possible.
2)
n
n!
n-j,1

(n-j)! (j-l)!

The density function for V is then given by:

ORAL A UCTION VERSUS SEALED BIDS

April 19791

3) f(V) =

n!
[F(V)] j 'l [1 - F(V)] n-j f(V)
(n-j)! 0-1)!

With V defined as the second highest value drawn, then for oral bidding procedure the expected winning bid (EB) equals:
k
4) EB

Vn(n-1) F(V)n- 2 (I-F(V))f(V)dv

=

Q
where: Q and k are, respectively, the upper and lower bounds on the value
of V.
The derivation of an expression for the expected value of the winning bid in a
sealed bid auction is more complicated as sealed bidding requires that bidders
formulate a bidding strategy. The strategy assumed here is one wherein all bidders maximize expected gains (EGi). EG i is defined to be the difference between
their value drawing (Vi) and the bid they submit (B) multiplied by the probability of their bid winning. Assuming that all bidders are risk neutral, the
objective function for any one bidder can be expressed as:
5) EGi = (V i - Bi)[G(Bi)]n-l

where: Vi is the value drawn, Bi is his bid, and G(Bi) is the probability of his
bid (B) exceeding that of any other bidder. Maximizing (EGi) with
respect to (B1 ) yields the optimal bidding rule:
.
6) Bi =V -

G(Bi)
(n-l)g(Bj)
where: g(Bi) is the first derivative of G(Bi).

Again, all bidders draw values from the same distribution and each knows this
fact. As a consequence, the bidding rule obtained must also yield a Nash equilibrium.* Given the relations above, a Nash equilibrium can be defined as the
situation in which the derived bidding rule is such that if n-1 bidders follow that
rule the remaining bidder cannot increase his expected gain by deviating from
the same general rule. Vickrey [1961] has shown that if a rule which yields a
Nash equilibrium can be explicitly derived, it becomes feasible to demonstrate
the equality of the expected winning bid for an oral and sealed bid auction.
Assume that the Vi's are drawn from a rectangular distribution over interval
(0,1) in both the oral and sealed bidding cases. For the sealed bid case, the
optimal bidding rule for each bidder is:
7) Bi = (-l)
n

. Vi.

It follows then that the expected value of the winning bid in the sealed bid
auction is:
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1

f (n-i) VnVn-ldV = n-i
fn
I
0
Using the rectangular distribution for the oral auction procedure the expected
winning bid given (4) becomes:
8) EB

=

1

9) EB

r

=

Vn(n'l)Vn- 2 (V)dV

= n-1

0
It is readily apparent the two procedures do, under these conditions, yield the
same expected winning bid.**
The solutions obtained above can provide some interesting insights into the
bidding process. First, if the number of bidders is assumed to be finite, then the
difference between the expected highest value drawn and the expected winning
bid can be considered a residual captured by the winning bidder. Each bidder in
an ex ante sense would attach a positive value to the right to participate in the
auction and stand a chance of capturing this surplus.
Although it may be tempting to think of an auction as a method wherein a
seller can exercise perfect price discrimination and capture the surplus, the conditions whereby the residual will be reduced to zero are extremely demanding
without additional constraints. It would require either n approaching infinity or
the distribution of the V's collapsing around a single point. It is reasonable to
postulate, however, that each bidder will undertake an expense related to inspection of the site and preparation of his bid. Given a cost to each bidder associated
with participation in the auction, then entry (increase in n) will take place until
the expected ex ante returns to each bidder equals the cost of participating.
Given bid preparation costs, the equilibrium condition for the number of bidders
participating in a given sale will be established by the condition that the aggregate amount expended on bid preparation by all bidders equals the difference
between the expected highest value drawn and the expected winning bid.
*For a discussion of the Nash Equilibrium conditions, see Vickrey, supra note 6.
**Although no general proof is available, the equality of oral and sealed bidding holds for
distribution other than the uniform and I know of no exception to this equality result.

APPENDIX B
Data Specification
The data used in the analysis was obtained from the U.S. Forest Service,
Washington, D.C. The Report of Timber Sale Forest Service Form #2400-17 is
the primary source for the data on individual sales. A summary description of
the variables used is contained in the table below.
All nominal values were deflated to constant 1967 prices by use of the Whole-
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sale Price Index (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Wholesale and PriceIndexes, Washington, D.C.
IDENTIFICATION COES OF VARIABLES USED
IN REGRESSION EQUATIONS
MSO = If (D - 1) method of sale is oral
SBA = If (D = 1) set-aside sale
=

Log of the number of bidders. The use of logs follows from the
bidding model shown in Appendix A.
FLAT = If (D = 1) payment is on a flat rate (Lump sum); if (D = 0)
payment is on a log scale basis.
CONST = Non-specified road construction (per thousand board feet)
SL = Skidding and loading costs (per thousand board feet)
GO = General overhead costs (per thousand board feet)
HAUL = Hauling costs per mile (per thousand board feet)
MFGC = Manufacturing costs (per thousand board feet)
FB = Falling and bucking costs (per thousand board feet)
ENVC = Environmental and protection costs (per thousand board feet)
PERPULP = Percentage of pulpwood on sale site (per thousand board feet)
PERDEAD = Percentage dead material on sale site (per thousand board feet)
AVGROAD = Road construction costs (per thousand board feet)
TOTROAD = Road construction costs (total). The sample was divided into
homogeneous and nonhomogeneous cases on the basis of this variable.
SELLV = Selling value of final products (per thousand board feet)
LogNBID

SALV = If (D = 1) salvage sale

VOL = Volume of timber
VOLSQ = Volume of timber squared
LUMB = Wholesale lumber price index
NOTE: D denotes a dummy variable.

